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1. Introduction 
Time-varying volatility (heteroscedasticity) of asset returns has attracted much research in the 
recent decades. Since the milestone papers of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) a great 
number of scholarly paper has been devoted to the topic. Their findings indicate that the 
phenomenon can be modeled by GARCH type models. Nevertheless, as the evidence shows 
below, no robust theoretical foundation has been proposed yet. 
Another important aspect of the autoregression puzzle is the asymmetry in the volatility process. 
In particular, the phenomenon known as “asymmetric volatility” implies that changes in the price 
of the underlying asset are negatively correlated with the volatility of the subsequent period. 
Despite the wide amount of literature devoted to asymmetric volatility (Black, 1976; Christie, 
1982; and Schwert, 1989), it still misses a robust explanation. 
Until now three main explanations for this latter puzzle have been proposed. The first is the 
leverage effect noted by Black (1976), Christie (1982) and Schwert (1989). The authors assume 
that if the value of an equity drops, the firm becomes more leveraged, therefore, the volatility of 
equity returns rises according to the increased risk, hence causing the negative relationship 
between return and subsequent volatility. They conclude, however, that, although volatility is 
indeed an increasing function of financial leverage, the effect by itself is not sufficient to account 
for the observed negative correlation. 
The second explanation labeled as the volatility feedback hypothesis states that in cases of 
unexpected increase in volatility (e.g. exogenous shocks), expected volatility rises accordingly, 
and thus increasing the required return of the given asset in line with equilibrium asset pricing 
models. This latter has an immediate negative impact on current stock price; therefore, it 
strengthens or weakens the magnitude of a previous shock subsequent to losses or gains 
respectively hence causing the asymmetry. Numerous papers on the topic provided evidence in 
support of both explanations (Pindyck, 1984; or Kim et al., 2004), yet recent studies still yield 
controversial results: on the one hand, Bollerslev et al. (2006) find that the analysis of high-
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frequency data indicates no significant volatility feedback, while on the other hand, Bekaert and 
Wu (2000) conclude that the leverage effect is insignificant.  
The third main explanation is given by McQueen and Vorkink (2004) – their initial setting is the 
closest to ours – proposing that volatility autocorrelation is due to investors’ inclusion of the 
fluctuation of prices in their perceived utility (i.e. loss-averse behavior). The authors assume that 
volatility increases both following gains and losses as in volatility feedback hypothesis. This 
assumption comes from the paper of Barberis et al. (2001), which latter provides an asset 
pricing interpretation of Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) experiment of prospect theory in a 
dynamic setting. The Barberis-Huang-Santos (2001) (henceforth BHS) paper assumes that 
perception of losses (gains) is more (less) painful (delightful) when they are subsequent to prior 
losses (gains). In other words, this latter means that previous losses increase and previous 
gains decrease risk-aversion. However, BHS do not take into account the entire analysis of 
Thaler and Johnson; the authors do not focus on the finding that investors become risk-seeking 
following losses and risk-averse subsequent to gains if the opportunity of breaking-even is 
included in the choice set, which, in fact, almost always applies to asset returns. As we show in 
Section 2, the individual dataset we use in this paper provides support for the latter hypothesis 
instead of the assumption of BHS. In other words, the pattern obtained in empirical tests 
suggest that, in contrast to BHS and McQueen and Vorkink, volatility indeed increases following 
losses and decreases subsequent to gains in order to allow or prevent breaking-even 
respectively. In Appendix 1 we provide a detailed discussion on the empirical evidence 
supporting the aforementioned patterns. 
It is also worth mentioning that the original setting in which autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedastic models were defined was the expected utility theory, that is, the dynamics of 
volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of asset returns in a given period) have been analyzed 
mostly in the setting of the mean-variance optimization of standard asset pricing models (e.g. 
the CAPM). However, contradictory results of this approach to utility perception have been well-
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documented, which would lead to biased interpretations. Therefore, we build our theoretical 
model on an alternative approach: the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
In our paper we apply this latter approach in a dynamic interpretation along with mental 
accounting and derive the microfoundations of heteroscedasticity. Our main findings are that (i) 
previous, unexpected shocks have negative, linear effect on the investors’ required return; (ii) 
this pattern yields a negative effect of previous market shocks on market volatility; (iii) our 
setting provides the microfoundations of a unit-root, asymmetric, autoregressive volatility 
process similar to Threshold Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(TGARCH) and Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic 
(EGARCH) models in discrete and continuous time respectively. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 the theoretical setting is derived along with the 
main empirical findings of behavioral patterns necessary to interpret the theory. Section 3 
discusses the behavioral patterns emerging in an individual trading dataset and an empirical 
parameter estimation of the model through a time-series analysis of asset prices. Finally, 
section 4 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper and provides potential ways of further 
research. 
 
2. The model 
As provided in Appendix 1, the previous market return plays a dominant role in the volatility 
dynamics of assets and is mainly responsible for the asymmetric response to shocks. We argue 
that this phenomenon can be explained by applying prospect theory in a dynamic setting.  
 
2.1. Dynamics of the required return 
Assuming that investors hold portfolios similar to the market portfolio, or at least that they 
diversify and hence invest into multiple assets, their portfolio is highly correlated with the 
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market. In other words, a negative or positive market shock leads to losses and gains on 
investors’ portfolios. Thaler and Johnson (1990) show in their experimental study that in such 
cases (if breaking even is in the choice set) investors become risk-seeking following losses and 
more risk-averse subsequent to gains; they aim to avoid realizing losses (exactly as in 
disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985 and Odean, 1998)) and are afraid of losing 
previous paper gains. This behavior comes from the S-shaped value function of loss-aversion: if 
we include the previous outcome as a reference point, the convexity of utility perception in the 
domain of losses results in risk-seeking behavior as the expected utility reaches its maximum at 
positive risk. In this specific case, considering the previous outcome as a fixed loss would cause 
greater pain than aggregating in time and hoping to break even; however, realizing the previous 
gain yields higher expected utility than taking the risk of losing the accumulated wealth. 
Therefore, mental accounting (the mental aggregation or separation of pieces of information) in 
a dynamic setting leads investors to aggregate in time. Hence, they aim to obtain a given 
reference return at each period or, at least, earn this return on average. That is, if we assume 
the rational expectations of outcomes as the reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006), the 
subsequent required return is decreased by the previous abnormal return to be able to obtain 
the pre-defined reference return on average. Analytically the aforementioned is described with 
the following equation 
 
µ௧ = µ௧ିଵ + 𝛼(r௧ିଵ − µ௧ିଵ) + 𝑟௙,௧ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ: 𝛼 ∈ [−1,0].    (1) 
 
where 𝑟௙,௧, 𝑟௧ and µ௧ stand for the risk-free rate, the portfolio return and the required portfolio 
return of a given investor respectively. In particular, if we assume that investors form their 
expectations rationally and allocate their portfolio accordingly (i.e. they choose from the efficient 
portfolios), µ௧ represents both the required and the expected return of their portfolio as the latter 
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two become equal. Therefore, r௧ିଵ − µ௧ିଵ stands for the abnormal portfolio return in the 
previous period, which modifies the current period required (expected) return through α. The 
economic interpretation of this latter variable is defined as the sensitivity of an investor to mental 
accounting (the aggregation of previous outcomes). It would make no sense to assume that 
market participants adjust the required return by more than the previous shock itself; hence, we 
set its lower boundary at -1. Its negative value is due to the definition: aggregating in time 
increases or decreases the required return subsequent to losses or gains respectively. The 
𝑟௙,௧ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ term is added as the correction for the change in the risk-free rate or inflation. We 
underline that evidence for the aforementioned patterns in the dynamics of risk-seeking, 
reference-dependence and framing have been bolstered by numerous studies from alternative 
field of science as well such as neuroeconomics (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) and non-human 
physiology (Chen et al, 2006; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011). These findings provide support 
for our theoretical setting and increase the relevance and robustness of the results. 
It is also worth mentioning here that autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (henceforth 
ARCH) models (Engle, 1982) were created in the setting of standard asset pricing models that 
are based on the expected utility theory (EUT); however, the latter would not yield the behavior 
described above. In contrast to prospect theory, EUT assumes concave utility in all domains of 
wealth, and therefore, would never induce risk-seeking behavior following losses. Therefore, the 
aforementioned behavior cannot be analyzed in a standard asset pricing structure; hence in 
order to give a coherent setting, the following section provides the definition of the risk-return 
relationship in prospect theory. 
 
2.2. The mean-volatility relationship in prospect theory 
The application of prospect theory in asset pricing attracted close attention in behavioral 
finance. Out of these, we discuss the most relevant findings that are related to our model. Levy 
and Levy (2004) argues that the mean-variance optimization of standard asset pricing models 
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applies to prospect theory as well. In particular, they find that the prospect theory efficient set is 
a subset of the mean-variance efficient frontier and even by including probability distortion, the 
two sets almost coincide. Their results are confirmed and extended to asset pricing models in 
the paper of De Giorgi et al. (2003) and Barberis and Huang (2008). The latter papers show that 
if the financial market equilibrium exists then the security market line theorem of CAPM holds 
under cumulative prospect theory as well. This finding also means that diversifying investors 
hold portfolios from the capital market line, and therefore, the relationship between volatility and 
expected return is linear for efficient portfolios. 
Adding this linearity to the theory of the inclusion of previous gains and losses (as in Eq. (1)) 
leads to linearly decreased and increased portfolio volatility subsequent to gains and losses 
respectively.  
 
2.3. The dynamics of portfolio volatility 
In the followings, we present an analytical derivation of the dynamics of volatility. We define the 
intertemporal change of volatility in Eq. (3) and (4). Here we assume that in an equilibrium 
setting the price of risk does not change over time; nonetheless, the required return is not 
constant but follows the dynamics of 
 
µ௧ = 𝑟௙,௧ + 𝛽𝜎௧ = µ௧ିଵ + 𝛼(r௧ିଵ − µ௧ିଵ) + 𝑟௙,௧ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ = 
= 𝑟௙,௧ + 𝛽𝜎௧ିଵ + 𝛼൫r௧ିଵ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ − 𝛽𝜎௧ିଵ൯.     (3) 
 
Here we applied the aforementioned linearity between risk and expected return of the CAPM 
setting. As long as we assume that investors hold well-diversified portfolios, only systematic risk 
is priced; therefore, 𝜎௧ stands for the market-related portfolio risk (henceforth volatility). 𝛽 
represents the slope of capital market line or the price of risk. The economic interpretation of 
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Eq. (3) is that subsequent to losses investors aim to obtain higher expected return; however, 
according to equilibrium pricing, they can only achieve their goal by investing in riskier assets or 
increasing leverage. Solving the latter equation for the dynamics of volatility yields 
 
𝜎௧ = 𝜎௧ିଵ +
𝛼
𝛽
൫r௧ିଵ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ − 𝛽𝜎௧ିଵ൯ = 𝜎௧ିଵ +
𝛼
𝛽
𝑒௧ିଵ = 
= 𝜎௧ିଵ +
ఈ
ఉ
𝜎௧ିଵ∆𝑊௧ିଵ = 𝜎௧ିଵ ቀ1 +
ఈ
ఉ
∆𝑊௧ିଵቁ,     (4) 
 
where 𝑒௧ିଵ and ∆𝑊௧ିଵ represent an error term and the change in the standard Wiener process 
in discrete time. Eq. (4) reveals that 𝜎௧ follows a unit-root process with constant conditional 
mean, that is 
 
𝐸[𝜎௧ାఛ|ℱ௧] = 𝜎௧ + 𝐸 ቂ∑
ఈ
ఉ
𝜎௜∆𝑊௜௧ାఛିଵ௜ୀ௧ |ℱ௧ቃ = 𝜎௧ +
ఈ
ఉ
∑ 𝐸[𝜎௜|ℱ௧]𝐸[∆𝑊௜|ℱ௧]௧ାఛିଵ௜ୀ௧ = 𝜎௧ +
ఈ
ఉ
∆𝑊௧ (5) 
 
where ℱ௧ stands for the filtration (information available) at time t. Here, the separation of 
contemporaneous volatility and noise requires the assumption that they are uncorrelated (only 
the delayed response yields a negative correlation). According to Eq. (5), the volatility process 
seems to be valid and realistic in the sense that periodical volatility tends to remain in a finite 
interval over a long horizon; it converges neither to infinity nor to zero. Furthermore, Eq. (4) 
reveals another interesting pattern: it is very similar to the Threshold Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (henceforth TGARCH) model introduced by 
Zakoian (1994) that is one of the most accurate heteroscedasticity models based on goodness-
of-fit tests (Awartani and Corradi, 2005; Tavares et al., 2008). In particular, TGARCH models 
are defined as 
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𝜎௧ = 𝐾 + 𝛿𝜎௧ିଵ + 𝛼ା𝑒௧ିଵା + 𝛼ି𝑒௧ିଵି    (6) 
 
where 𝑒௧ିଵା = ൜
𝑒௧ିଵ 𝑖𝑓 𝑒௧ିଵ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑒௧ିଵ ≤ 0
 and 𝑒௧ିଵି = ൜
𝑒௧ିଵ 𝑖𝑓 𝑒௧ିଵ ≤ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑒௧ିଵ > 0
. Therefore, the special case of Eq. 
(4) implies that 𝐾 = 0, 𝛿 = 1 and 𝛼ା = 𝛼ି = ఈ
ఉ
. Effects of previous gains and losses could be 
handled separately in Eq. (4) as well by using different 𝛼ା and 𝛼ି; however, as we show below, 
previous gains play only a much less significant role in the asymmetric effect on volatility. 
Nevertheless, distinct 𝛼ା and 𝛼ି would also have a reasonable economic interpretation: 
considering that extreme gains do not cause a negative required return, that is, investors cannot 
and will not invest in assets with negative expected return irrespective of the previous 
outcomes, gains should have a less significant effect on the subsequently required return, 
therefore, 𝛼ା should differ from 𝛼ି. 
Another interpretation of Eq. (4) leads to another well-fitting, asymmetric GARCH model: the 
Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) by Nelson, 
(1991). Dividing by 𝜎௧ିଵ and taking the natural logarithms of both sides yields 
 
ln 𝜎௧ = ln 𝜎௧ିଵ + ln ቀ1 +
ఈ
ఉ
∆𝑊௧ିଵቁ.      (7) 
 
Taking the Taylor approximation around ∆𝑊௧ିଵ = 0 then gives 
 
ln 𝜎௧ = ln 𝜎௧ିଵ +
ఈ
ఉ
∆𝑊௧ିଵ −
ଵ
ଶ
ቀఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
∆𝑊௧ିଵ
ଶ + ∑
(ିଵ)೙షభ
௡!
ቀఈ
ఉ
ቁ
௡
∆𝑊௧ିଵ
௡ஶ
௡ୀଷ .  (8) 
 
Due to the well-known property of the Wiener process, as Δt approaches to zero (the 
continuous time version is considered) third and higher order polynomials of ∆𝑊௧ vanish and 
∆𝑊௧
ଶ = ∆𝑡. Therefore, the continuous time version of Eq. (7) can be written as 
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ln 𝜎௧ = ln 𝜎௧ିଵ +
ఈ
ఉ
𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ −
ଵ
ଶ
ቀఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
𝑑𝑡,     (9) 
 
or by multiplying both sides by 2 
 
ln 𝜎௧ଶ = ln 𝜎௧ିଵଶ + 2
ఈ
ఉ
𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ − ቀ
ఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
𝑑𝑡.    (10) 
 
The similarity to EGARCH comes from its definition of 
 
ln 𝜎௧ଶ = 𝜔 + 𝛽ଵ[𝜃𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ + 𝜆(|𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ| − 𝐸|𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ|)] + 𝛼ଵ ln 𝜎௧ିଵଶ,  (11) 
 
where 𝜔 = − ቀఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
𝑑𝑡, 2 ఈ
ఉ
= 𝛽ଵ𝜃, 𝜆 = 0 and 𝛼ଵ = 𝛼 yields exactly Eq. (10). The unit-root, constant 
conditional mean property of Eq. (10) is again found by applying Itō’s lemma for 
 
𝑥௧ ≡ ln 𝜎௧ଶ , 𝑑𝑥௧ = 2
ఈ
ఉ
𝑑𝑊௧ − ቀ
ఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
𝑑𝑡.    (12) 
 
Then the inverse function is defined as 
 
𝜎௧ = 𝑒଴.ହ௫೟.     (13) 
 
By Itō’s lemma 
 
𝑑𝜎௧ = ቈ− ൬
𝛼
𝛽
൰
ଶ 𝜕𝜎௧
𝜕𝑥௧
+
1
2
൬2
𝛼
𝛽
൰
ଶ 𝜕ଶ𝜎௧
𝜕𝑥௧ଶ
቉ + 2
𝛼
𝛽
𝜕𝜎௧
𝜕𝑥௧
𝑑𝑊௧ = 
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= ൤− ቀఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
0.5𝜎௧ +
ଵ
ଶ
ቀ2 ఈ
ఉ
ቁ
ଶ
0.25𝜎௧൨ + 2
ఈ
ఉ
0.5𝜎௧𝑑𝑊௧ିଵ =
ఈ
ఉ
𝜎௧𝑑𝑊௧.   (14) 
 
Again, the correlation between concurrent volatility and noise has zero expected value, 
therefore, the conditional mean is constant regardless of the length of delay. In conclusion, the 
TGARCH and EGARCH models are implications of prospect theory in a dynamic setting and 
they represent the underlying volatility process in discrete and continuous time respectively. 
 
2.4. The dynamics of market volatility 
We have derived so far the change of investors’ risk attitude and the dynamics of the volatility of 
their portfolios. However, reasons behind the change of market volatility have not yet been 
covered. In this section, we propose an explanation for the positive relationship between the 
dynamics of market volatility and the riskiness of investors’ portfolio based on a simple market 
microstructural idea. 
As discussed above, mental accounting leads to a clear pattern in investors choice that 
depends on the previous unexpected price shock: losses increase the subsequent demand for 
risky assets, whereas, gains reduce their demand. If we stick to the idea that, as assumed in 
Section 2.2, investors hold the market portfolio or at least a well-diversified one that is correlated 
with the market, one can clearly see the following market microstructural situation: in line with 
the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) we find informed and uninformed traders in the market 
with probabilities 𝜋 and (1 − 𝜋) that place market orders. In their model the informed investors 
know the exact value of an asset that can be either high (𝑣ு) or low (𝑣௅) and place their orders 
accordingly. Other participants of the market, such as the specialists that provide the liquidity by 
placing limit orders (thus define the spread) know only the probability of the true value that is 
𝑃(𝑣 = 𝑣ு) = 𝜃 and 𝑃(𝑣 = 𝑣௅) = 1 − 𝜃. Uninformed investors place their buy and sell orders 
  12 
completely randomly; hence, the probabilities of buy and sell orders coming from uninformed 
traders are equal (𝑃 = 0.5). 
Therefore, the profit of specialists is generated by the losses on transactions with informed 
investors and gains on transactions with uninformed investors. If we assume that the market is 
competitive, their zero expected profit criteria for transactions at the buy limit price and at the 
sell limit price yield the equilibrium ask and bid prices respectively (and the spread as their 
difference). 
Moreover, if we introduce the pattern discussed in the previous sections, the spread changes in 
the following way: let us assume that, based on mental accounting heuristic, there is a new type 
of investors in addition to informed and uninformed traders, the heuristic-driven investor. This 
latter definition is not new in related literature: although, according to the pioneering papers of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) uninformed traders are defined as those who do 
not possess fundamental information on assets, irrespective of their motives, a definition similar 
to our setting has already appeared in the paper of Bloomfield et al. (2009b), in which 
uninformed investors can have other trading motives than fundamental (e.g. behavioral). In their 
study the similar three-class distinction of investors is analyzed, where informed and uninformed 
investors and liquidity traders are present. The liquidity trader, however, may follow a behavioral 
pattern according to the dynamics of liquidity demand we have discussed so far; hence, we call 
this class the heuristic-driven trader. 
Turning back to the introduction of such traders in the equilibrium criteria, let 𝜋 and 𝛿 and 
(1 − 𝜋 − 𝛿) stand for the shares of informed, heuristic-driven and uninformed traders (the 
probability of their trades). Then, subsequent to a negative market shock, the zero profit criteria 
of specialists at the ask and bid prices can be defined as 
 
𝜃𝜋(𝑎 − 𝑣ு) + 𝛿(𝑎 − 𝑣) + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 − 𝛿)(𝑎 − 𝑣) = 0 ,  (15) 
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(1 − 𝜃)𝜋( 𝑣௅ − 𝑏) + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 − 𝛿)(𝑣 − 𝑏) = 0 ,   (16) 
 
Then the ask price is given as 
 
ఏగ௩ಹା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)௩
ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)
= 𝑣 + ఏగ൫௩
ಹି௩൯
ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)
= 𝑣 + ఏగ
(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)
   (17) 
 
whereas the bid price follows 
 
(ଵିఏ)గ௩ಽା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)௩
(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)
= 𝑣 +
(ଵିఏ)గ൫௩ಽି௩൯
(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)
= 𝑣 − ఏగ
(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)
 (18) 
 
One can clearly see the economic processes underlying in the aforementioned formulas: if 
herustic-driven traders are present the midprice differs from the expected value. Subsequent to 
a negative shock, the 𝛿 proportion of investors place buy orders at the ask price; however, they 
do not form supply at the bid price. Furthemore, their uninformed trades contribute positively to 
the profit; therefore, the equilibrium ask price declines as in Eq. (17). Still, their existence lowers 
the proportion of uninformed investors; hence, the equilibrium bid price declines as well as in 
Eq. (18). Although, both the ask and bid prices decline, the zero profit remains intact due to the 
modified probabilities of incoming buy and sell orders.  
Then, the spread in competitive equilibrium can be defined as 
 
𝑆ି =
ఏగ(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)
+ ఏగ
(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)
= ఏగ
(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
[ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)][(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)]
 (19) 
 
where 𝑆ି stands for the spread subsequent to a negative market shock. The spread following 
positive market shocks is similar except for the sign of 𝛿: 
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𝑆ା =
ఏగ(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
[ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగିఋ)][(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగାఋ)]
.    (20) 
 
Let the spread be defined as a function of 𝛥 where  
 
𝛥 = ൜
𝛿 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
−𝛿 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 , 
 
𝑆(𝛥) = ఏగ
(ଵିఏ)൫௩ಹି௩ಽ൯
[ఏగା଴.ହ(ଵିగା௱)][(ଵିఏ)గା଴.ହ(ଵିగି௱)]
 .    (21) 
 
Then 𝑆ି > 𝑆ା if and only if 𝑆(|𝛥|) > 𝑆(−|𝛥|). As the numerator takes on a constant value in the 
function, we focus on the denominator value 𝑓(∆). Then, 𝑆ି > 𝑆ା if and only if 𝑓(|𝛥|) < 𝑓(−|𝛥|), 
where 
 
𝑓(∆) = [𝜃𝜋 + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 + 𝛥)][(1 − 𝜃)𝜋 + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 − 𝛥)]  (22) 
 
is a concave, second order polynomial function of ∆. If and only if the maximum place of this 
function is reached in its negative domain, then 𝑓(|𝛥|) < 𝑓(−|𝛥|) is always true. Therefore, it is 
enough to test whether 
 
argmax
∆
𝑓(∆) < 0.     (23) 
 
According to the first order condition 
 
0.5[(1 − 𝜃)𝜋 + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 − 𝛥)] − 0.5[𝜃𝜋 + 0.5(1 − 𝜋 + 𝛥)] = 0 , 
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𝛥 = (1 − 2𝜃)𝜋 .     (24) 
 
Hence, if and only if 𝜃 > 0.5, then argmax
∆
𝑓(∆) < 0, 𝑓(|𝛥|) < 𝑓(−|𝛥|), 𝑆(|𝛥|) > 𝑆(−|𝛥|) and 𝑆ି >
𝑆ା. In other words, if the probability of a subsequent higher value is greater than that of a lower 
value, then spread is greater subsequent to a negative shock than it is following a positive 
shock.  
The economic intuition behind an average 𝜃 > 0.5 is simple as the growth of value is one of the 
basic assumptions in analyzing capital markets. This greater probability of a higher value is 
confirmed by empirical studies as well: although the authors apply a bit different methodology, 
Easley et al. (2002) and Brennan et al. (2014)  measure the probability of an increase in the 
value to be 𝑃(𝑣|𝑣 = 𝑣ு) = 0.67 and 0.614. The aforementioned pattern is represented in Figure 
1, where the spread (defined as in Eq. (21)) is shown as a function of 𝜃 and 𝜋: the calculation is 
made for the constraints of 𝜃, 𝜋 ∈ [0.1,0.9], 𝛿 = 0.1, 𝑣ு − 𝑣௅ = 1. Irrespective of probability of 
informed trading, 𝜋 (shown in the vertical axis), the difference of spread is clearly positive for 
probability of higher value (shown in the horizontal axis), 𝜃 > 0.5 and negative for 𝜃 < 0.5 if the 
probability of heuristic-driven investors is positive. 
 
Figure 1: The formation of spread if heuristic-driven trading is present 
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Notes: The figure represents the spread values according to the colorbar to the right. The axes, Theta and Pi stand 
for the probability of high value and the probability of informed traders. The difference between high and low values, 
𝑣ு − 𝑣௅ is set to one. The probability of heuristic-driven traders is defined by 𝛿 = 0.1. 
 
In conclusion, we argue that, on average, the spread increases subsequent to losses and 
decreases subsequent to gains. Moreover, considering that continuous market orders at the ask 
and bid prices define the standard deviation of price changes, our explanation clearly implies 
that previous positive (negative) shocks decrease (increase) both the spread and the volatility 
accordingly. 
Related literature provides further support to our aforementioned reasoning. Park and 
Sabourian (2011) analyze a similar setting based on the Glosten-Milgrom model and find that 
people act as contrarian if their information leads them to concentrate on middle values. Kaniel 
et al. (2008), Choe et al. (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001), Richards (2005), 
Bloomfield et al. (2009a) also confirm the existence of such contrarian traders. Moreover, 
according to Lof (2014), the introduction of contrarian trading in asset pricing models 
dramatically increases the predictive power of the models. Furthermore, our former, mental 
accounting-based explanation for the contrarian activity is supported by Yao and Li (2013) who 
argue that prospect theory investors can behave as contrarian noise traders in a market, while 
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Kadous et al. (2014) finds that investors act as contrarians if and only if they have held in the 
past the particular asset that they buy in the subsequent period; this latter provides evidence 
that mental accounting and prospect theory are indeed responsible for the negative feedback 
trading instead of an alternative exogenous factor. For the well-documented, significant, positive 
relationship between spread and price volatility see Hussain (2011) Wang and Yau (2000), 
Wyart et al. (2008). 
 
3. Empirical results 
In this section we present empirical results supporting our theory in two different ways: first, 
investors’ dynamic behavior is tested on a large sample containing individual trading data; 
second, an empirical parameter estimation of our volatility model is provided using CRSP 
database consisting of the daily log-returns of the Standard and Poor’s 500 index member listed 
on 10 September, 2014. The analyzed period covers 21 years from 10 September 1993 to 10 
September 2014. 
 
3.1. Patterns in intertemporal choice 
In the followings, we provide empirical support to our theoretical investigation: losses and gains 
induce risk-seeking and more risk-averse behavior respectively. We argue that this behavior is a 
response to loss-aversion in a dynamic context, that is, investors are reluctant to realize losses 
(either physically or mentally) and try to break even in order to obtain their initial benchmark on 
average. According to equilibrium asset pricing, higher required return that compensates for the 
previous loss is only reachable by investing in assets with increased risk; therefore, combined 
with the change in risk attitude, losses increase the volatility of returns in the subsequent period. 
Gains follow the opposite pattern: investors fear of losing the previous wealth; hence, they 
invest into less risky portfolios since the initial benchmark level is still reachable with the latter. 
  18 
The data and methodology of this analysis are as follows: Our sample is similar to that of Barber 
and Odean (2000) consisting of the transactions and descriptive data of 158,006 accounts at a 
large discount brokerage firm from January 1991 to December 1996. In this paper we aim at 
defining the change in the riskiness (as measured by volatility) of investors’ portfolio; therefore, 
only common stocks investments are considered, since a meaningful amount of historical 
returns and realized volatility can only be calculated for these latter assets. Nevertheless, 
findings in this reduced sub-sample should be representative for the whole sample as the 
former account for 64% of the latter as measured by the number of observations. Altogether, the 
dataset containing at least one common stock transaction in the period includes 104,225 
accounts, which can be further decomposed based on the type of the account, in which we 
apply cash, IRA and margin accounts as control variables, and the equity held by the related 
household at the end of the period. In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of these sub-samples are 
presented. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
  All accounts Cash accounts IRA accounts Margin accounts 
Num. of accounts 104,225 22,995 37,155 10,328 
Mean equity 68,293 39,859 48,988 47,953 
Median equity 18,288 8,419 21,549 4,426 
St. dev. of equity 300,450 129,257 129,017 247,607 
Num. of trades 1,969,747 260,039 486,889 255,759 
Mean number of trades 19 11 13 25 
Notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics of the trading accounts included in our dataset. 
 
In return calculations we use different types of mental frames. First, we assume that when 
selling occurs the profit is measured as the selling price relative to the pre-transaction average 
buy price of an asset. However, as the long position in an asset may include numerous buy 
transactions before selling the stock, we argue that if the representativity or anchoring heuristics 
are responsible for the change in the risk attitude, the most recent information (i.e. the price of 
the last buy transaction) is the main factor in utility perception. Having calculated the gain or 
loss, the asset into which the realized money flows in the subsequent buy transaction is defined. 
Related to both the bought and sold assets the variance and standard deviation of daily returns 
in the preceding year are calculated. Finally, based on the aforementioned parameters, 
regressions are estimated to analyze whether the risk of the targeted asset is driven by the 
previous outcome. 
The first regression (first 2 columns in Table 2) applies the simple OLS estimation of the 
variance of the targeted asset including the profit (the return based on the average buy price) of 
the previous transaction as the independent variable, that is 
 
𝜎௕,௜ଶ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢?̅?௦,௜ + 𝑒௜,      (25) 
 
where 𝜎௕,௜ଶ and ?̅?௦,௜, stand for the variance of the asset in the subsequent buy transaction and 
the average return of the realized sell transaction of each i trade pair respectively. 
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In the second regression we test whether the change in the definition of the return increases 
significance and goodness-of-fit. This estimation is shown in Eq. (26) where the previous profit 
𝑟௦,௜ is measured as the return on the price of the last transaction.  
 
𝜎௕,௜ଶ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௦,௜ + 𝑒௜,      (26) 
 
One may argue that the variance also correlates with the risk of the sold asset as well: an 
investor may have a preference for risky assets, which could lead to a biased estimation of 𝛽ଵ෢ in 
the previous equation. Therefore, the third regression (Eq. (27)) includes 𝜎௦,௜ଶ as the variance of 
the sold asset using the return on the last buy price respectively. 
 
𝜎௕,௜ଶ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௦,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝜎௦,௜ଶ + 𝑒௜,     (27) 
 
According to equilibrium pricing, investors do require a premium for risk; thus, their expected 
return is different from zero. Including this finding in the fourth regression, a new definition of 
return may provide a better fit to utility perception: here the perceived return is defined as the 
deviation from the historical (one year) expected return at the last buy transaction preceding the 
sell transaction of an asset. In other words, we assume that investors form their non-zero 
expectations at the time they invest into an asset based on its performance in the past. 
Accordingly, as both the length of time between last buy and subsequent sell transactions and 
the risk of assets varies throughout the data, another adjustment is required: the expected 
return is not the same for each transaction; hence, we standardize the deviation from the 
expected return by dividing it by the number of days between the buy and sell transactions. 
Subsequent to this definition we use this daily average deviation from the expectation as an 
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independent variable as in the following Eq. (28), where 𝑡௦ and 𝑡௣௕ stand for the time when the 
sell and the previous buy transactions occurred: 
 
𝜎௕,௜ଶ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝜎௦,௜ଶ + 𝑒௜ ∶  𝑟௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ =
௥ೞ,೔ିா൫௥೔|௧ୀ௧೛್൯
௧ೞି௧೛್
     (28) 
 
In order to be able to distinguish effects of previous gains from losses we apply two separated 
variables in regression five as defined in Eq. (29): 
 
𝜎௕,௜ଶ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟 ௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝑟ା௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ + 𝛽ଷ෢𝜎௦,௜ଶ + 𝑒௜ ∶  𝑟 ௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ = min൫𝑟௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ , 0൯ , 𝑟ା௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ = max൫𝑟௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ , 0൯   (29) 
 
Having analyzed the effects of previous outcomes on risk attitude as measured by variance, we 
provide further tests that include volatility instead of the former. The importance of this additional 
analysis is already highlighted in section 2.2, where we discussed that asset prices in prospect 
theory are driven by standard deviation rather than variance. Hence, in further regressions we 
apply volatility as the dependent variable. The sixth regression is the same as Eq. (29) except 
for the previously defined change in the definition of risk. 
Our extensive dataset covers further parameters related to each trading account; in particular, 
the equity held at the end of the period and the type of the account is included as well. In further 
regressions we also apply these latter measures as control variables and investigate differences 
between the subgroups. The seventh regression is defined as in Eq. (30), where 𝐸௜, 𝐷஼,௜, 𝐷ூ,௜ and 
𝐷ெ,௜ stand for the equity, the cash type dummy, the IRA type dummy and the margin dummy of 
the account related to the ith transaction respectively. 
 
𝜎௕,௜ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௦௧ௗ,௦,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝜎௦,௜ + 𝛽ଷ෢𝐸௜ + 𝛽ସ෢𝐷஼,௜ + 𝛽ହ෢𝐷ூ,௜ + 𝛽଺෢𝐷ெ,௜ +  𝑒௜,    (30) 
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In regression eight we modify Eq. (30) according to Eq. (29), that is, by separately estimating 
the coefficients of gains and losses. Then, in subsequent estimations we apply this latter frame 
in subgroup estimations: in the ninth equation the effects for accounts with equity value above 
its median (i.e. the top 50% of investors ranked by equity value) are estimated, whereas the 
tenth calculates coefficients for the bottom 50%. In the last three regressions effects for 
subgroups with a cash, IRA and margin account types are estimated. 
In Table 2 we provide the empirical results of the estimations: results for groups of regressions 
one to three, four to six, seven to ten and eleven to thirteen are shown in Panel A, B, C and D 
respectively. 
Table 2: Regression results 
Panel A 
  Subsequent σ2 Subsequent σ2 Subsequent σ2 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
(Intercept) 2.32E-03 0.0000 2.32E-03 0.0000 2.22E-03 0.0000 
Average 
return -8.60E-05 0.0010 - - - - 
Return on the 
last trade - - -9.47E-05 0.0005 -1.09E-05 0.6885 
Previous 
variance - - - - 4.94E-02 0.0000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0026 - 
Panel B 
  Subsequent σ2 Subsequent σ2 Subsequent σ 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
(Intercept) 2.21E-03 0.0000 2.17E-03 0.0000 3.00E-02 0.0000 
Previous 
variance 2.21E-03 0.0000 4.69E-02 0.0000 - - 
Expected 
return   - - - - 
Difference of 
last return -1.63E-03 0.0003 - - - - 
Positive diff. 
of last return - - 4.72E-03 0.0000 6.65E-03 0.0071 
Negative diff. 
of last return - - -7.78E-03 0.0000 -1.48E-02 0.0000 
Previous 
volatility - - - - 2.32E-01 0.0000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0027 - 0.0031 - 0.0386 - 
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Panel C 
  Subsequent σ Subsequent σ Subsequent σ if Equity>=Median 
Subsequent σ if 
Equity<Median 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
(Intercept) 3.08E-02 0 3.08E-02 0.0000 3.09E-02 0.0000 3.16E-02 0.0000 
Difference of 
last return -4.11E-03 0.0135 - - - - - - 
Positive diff. 
of last return - - 5.53E-03 0.0251 7.49E-03 0.0429 2.43E-03 0.4627 
Negative diff. 
of last return - - -1.35E-02 0.0000 -9.93E-03 0.0098 -1.47E-02 0.0000 
Previous 
volatility 2.30E-01 0 2.28E-01 0.0000 1.99E-01 0.0000 2.48E-01 0.0000 
Equity -2.06E-09 0 -2.06E-09 0.0000 -1.61E-09 0.0000 -5.31E-08 0.0000 
Cash dummy -5.33E-04 0.0008 -5.25E-04 0.0010 -5.60E-04 0.0213 -9.45E-04 0.0000 
IRA dummy -1.66E-03 0 -1.67E-03 0.0000 -3.16E-03 0.0000 -1.96E-04 0.2380 
Margin 
dummy 1.50E-03 0 1.49E-03 0.0000 2.57E-03 0.0000 1.37E-04 0.4620 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0419 - 0.0419 - 0.0348 - 0.0467 - 
 
Panel D 
  Subsequent σ for cash account Subsequent σ for IRA account Subsequent σ for margin account 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
(Intercept) 3.00E-02 0.0000 2.84E-02 0.0000 3.06E-02 0.0000 
Positive diff. 
of last return 5.11E-02 0.0000 7.26E-03 0.1573 -1.28E-02 0.0388 
Negative diff. 
of last return -9.60E-04 0.9195 -3.50E-03 0.4974 -1.77E-02 0.0009 
Previous 
volatility 2.44E-01 0.0000 2.60E-01 0.0000 2.66E-01 0.0000 
Equity -6.65E-09 0.0000 -4.80E-09 0.0000 -9.63E-10 0.0000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0531 - 0.0565 - 0.0479 - 
Notes: The table represents regression results for equations (25) to (30) and their adjustments. The dependent 
variables are listed in the columns, the Coef columns represent the estimated coefficients for the parameters listed in 
the rows, whereas the p-value columns stand for the probability of an incorrect rejection of the zero null hypothesis. 
 
Results of the first four regressions indicate that regardless of the type of return, the aggregate 
effect of previous outcomes on risk attitude is significantly negative even if the previous variance 
is included, which supports our theory of dynamic loss-aversion. Even though, we find a minor 
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increase in the significance by changing the reference point from the average return to the 
return relative to the price of the last buy transaction first, then to the return relative to the 
historical expected return second, the extremely low adjusted R-squared values indicate non-
linear dynamics or missing variables. Regression five yields a possible reason for this latter 
finding: gains and losses have a distinct effect on risk attitude, although, separating the previous 
outcomes by their sign does add a lot to the goodness-of-fit of the latter models. 
This problem is well handled by changing the risk measure to volatility: regression six shows 
that the adjusted R-squared value jumps, which supports our discussion on the linear 
relationship between standard deviation and expected return in Section 2.2. 
Results of the volatility estimation of regression seven indicate four main findings: first, the 
aggregate effect of previous outcomes is significantly negative again; second, equity has 
negative effect on risk-appetite indicating that investors holding larger amounts in capital assets 
invest into less risky portfolios; third, market participants with cash and retirement (IRA) 
accounts also avoid risk shown by their negative coefficient; fourth, margin account holders 
have higher appetite for risk as shown by the positive relationship between subsequent volatility 
and the margin dummy. 
Altogether, regressions in Panel C all indicate a similar pattern as before: negative differences 
relative to the expected return have a significant and negative effect on the subsequent risk-
appetite, whereas positive differences are either much less significant or not significant at all. In 
particular, regressions nine and ten show that choices of high-income investors are just as 
sensitive to previous outcomes as low-income investors. 
In Panel D regression results show a somewhat mixed picture: although coefficients are not 
significant everywhere, the previous patterns apply to every subgroup except for the coefficient 
of the positive previous return of margin account holders. In this latter group, both previous 
gains and losses are significantly negative leading to lower and higher subsequent volatility 
respectively. 
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Altogether, we find similar results to the aggregated regression of Eq. (30) and its adjustment for 
separated gains and losses. Although, for positive deviations from the expected return we find a 
statistically significant positive effect on subsequent volatility, we argue that the low p-values are 
due to the extremely high number of observations. Following Lin et al. (2011) we provide here a 
test for the economic significance and analyze the effect of increasing number of observations 
on the significance of the coefficients of the previous outcome. According to our theoretical 
explanation, positive deviations from the expected return are also negatively correlated with 
subsequent volatility; nevertheless, since volatility is non-negative, huge realized gains lead to 
exactly the same portfolio choice (i.e. the risk-free asset) as a gain that is just high enough to 
cover two subsequent periods of the required return. Therefore, positive returns higher than a 
relatively small level (at least twice of the expected return) cannot be described by a linear 
relationship with volatility but are driven by a random process. This leads to the fact that for a 
reasonable number of observations, where the case of “too big to fail” does not apply, p-values 
of the positive coefficient should not indicate a significant effect. The last three regressions in 
Panel C (regressions eight to ten), in which the p-value of the coefficient of previous gains is 
much higher than that of losses, suggest such relationship; however, for such high number of 
observations a tiny effect may prove to be significant. 
Hence, in Figure 2 we present the coefficient p-values as a function of the number of 
observations, in which regression eight is estimated with the following methodology: first, we 
draw 100 random sub-samples for each sample size going from 100 to 10000; second, for each 
of these 100 random sub-samples regression eight is estimated; third, the p-value of the 100 the 
coefficients obtain for each sample size is defined. We plot these p-values as a function of the 
sample size, where the continuous, dashed and dotted lines stand for the p-values of gains, 
losses and the 0.05 level respectively. One can clearly see that the coefficient of losses is 
always significant for sample sizes at least as high as 2500, whereas for gains p-values are 
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above 0.05 even for sample sizes around 10,000. We argue that this finding supports our 
explanation of the economically insignificant effect of previous gains. 
 
Figure 2: Coefficient p-values of previous outcomes as a function of the sample size 
 
Notes: The figure represents the coefficient p-values of losses and gains in regression eight as the function of 
number of observations. We use random sampling in order to obtain lower number of observations. The solid, dashed 
and dotted line stand for the p-values of gains, losses and the 0.05 level respectively. 
 
Another way to handle the non-linearity problem of previous gains would be to use a simple 
dummy variable for positive shocks. The intuition behind this idea is that if the expected return is 
relatively very small compared to the positive shocks, then, shocks exceeding this expected 
return have a constant effect on volatility, since investors would not and cannot reduce their 
required return and portfolio volatility to values below zero: they hold assets providing at least 
the risk-free return with zero volatility. Therefore, there is a discontinuity in the model for gains, 
which can be handled with the use of a dummy variable. 
In the followings, we compare the results of the aforementioned model applying a dummy 
variable for gains and the model assuming a linear relationship between previous gains and 
subsequent volatility. Table 3 represents our findings. 
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Table 3: Regression results of volatility dynamics 
 Subsequent σ 
 Coef p-value Coef p-value 
(Intercept) 3.08E-02 0.0000 3.11E-02 0.0000 
Positive diff. dummy - - -6.12E-04 0.0000 
Positive diff. of last return 5.53E-03 0.0251 - - 
Negative diff. of last return -1.35E-02 0.0000 -9.73E-03 0.0001 
Previous volatility 2.28E-01 0.0000 2.29E-01 0.0000 
Equity -2.06E-09 0.0000 -2.07E-09 0.0000 
Cash dummy -5.25E-04 0.0010 -5.49E-04 0.0006 
IRA dummy -1.67E-03 0.0000 -1.67E-03 0.0000 
Margin dummy 1.49E-03 0.0000 1.48E-03 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0419 - 0.0420 - 
Notes: The table represents regression results for two regressions between previous outcomes and subsequent 
volatility. The dependent variable is listed in the columns, the Coef columns represent the estimated coefficients for 
the independent variables listed in the rows, whereas the p-value columns stand for the probability of an incorrect 
rejection of the zero null hypothesis. 
 
The results indicate three important findings: first, by avoiding the discontinuity problem the 
regression model support our idea of a positive relationship between previous gains and 
volatility instead of linearity; second, this relationship becomes much more significant than in the 
linear model and therefore, all the variables have extremely low p-values; third, the adjusted R-
squared also increases in the new model suggesting a better fit with the dummy variable. 
Hence, altogether the findings support the negative relationship proposed in our theoretical 
model. 
In conclusion, we argue that the results presented in this subsection confirm the empirical 
validity of the behavioral side of our explanation. The aggregate coefficient of previous 
outcomes is negative and significant everywhere, even in regressions where other control 
variables are included. In particular, it seems irrelevant whether we test the effect on low- or 
high-income investors; the pattern emerges for all of them. Therefore, as a confirmation of the 
theoretical model described in Section 2, we find that previous outcomes indeed affect asset 
allocation and, subsequent to losses and gains, yield a money inflow into assets with higher and 
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lower risk respectively. This finding is confirmed in existing literature on mutual fund activity as 
well, in which a negative relationship was found between returns and subsequent money inflows 
(Warther, 1995; Goetzman and Massa, 1999; Edelen and Warner, 1999) and between 
contemporaneous inflow of equity and bond funds (Goetzmann et al., 2000). Therefore, we 
argue that our model can capture and explain the unexpected changes in the demand for capital 
assets. 
 
3.2. Estimating a volatility model 
Based on the findings presented above, the empirical estimation of the theoretical volatility 
model is presented in the followings. The α and β parameters in Eq. (31), in line with Section 2.3 
and 2.4, stand for the effect of intertemporal mental accounting on subsequent volatility and the 
price of risk respectively. Although, in the current case, α represents the aggregate effect on 
subsequent market volatility instead of the effect on an individual investor’s portfolio risk, these 
coefficients are estimated according to Eq. (31), which latter is alternative form of Eq. (3). Our 
applied dataset covers the return and volatility time series of the daily values of the CRSP 
value-weighted equity index using both weekly and monthly periods covering the 21 years 
between 10 September 1993 and 10 September 2014. The periodic returns are defined as the 
sum of logarithmic daily returns. The volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the daily 
returns during the given period; however, since this would show the daily volatility, it is multiplied 
by the ratio of the standard deviation of weekly returns divided by the standard deviation of daily 
returns (the adjustment to weekly from daily sampling). The estimation is based on simulating 
an additional error term 𝑒௧ of Eq. (3), that is 
 
𝑒௧ = 𝑟௧ − ቀ𝑟௙,௧ + 𝛽𝜎௧ିଵ + 𝛼൫r௧ିଵ − 𝑟௙,௧ିଵ − 𝛽𝜎௧ିଵ൯ቁ.    (31) 
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where 𝛼 ∈ [−1,0] and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. Here, the error term is not homoscedastic, therefore, we define 
the standardized error ut as 
 
  𝑢௧ =
௘೟
ఙ೟
.      (32) 
 
First the distribution of the error is estimated based on maximum likelihood. As Jarque-Bera 
tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of normality, the standardized 𝑢௧ is assumed to follow a 
scaled Student’s-t distribution with 𝐸(𝑢௧) = 0. Therefore, the estimated parameters consist of 
the scaling s and degress of freedom df. Due to non-linear likelihood optimization, the fitted 
distribution is particularly sensitive to the starting values of the degrees of freedom. Hence, we 
provide ten estimations for each α and β pair, in which the ten starting values of the degrees of 
freedom are numbers equally placed in a logarithmic scale between one and the number of 
observations. For example, our monthly analysis includes 1061 monthly returns; therefore, the 
applied starting values for the degrees of freedom are 1, 2, 5, 10, 22, 48, 104, 226, 489 and 
1061. The starting value of the scaling parameter is always set to one. Out of the ten 
estimations, the one with the highest Kolmogorov-Smirnoff p-value (the best fit) is chosen. 
Second, we apply a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for each α and β pair to measure the significance 
of the difference between the empirical and estimated distribution functions. These pairs include 
10201 sets consisting of the crossproducts of 101 equally placed α values between -1 and zero, 
and 101 equally placed β values between zero and 1. The higher the p-value, the better the fit; 
therefore, the ቂ
𝛼
𝛽ቃ pair yielding the highest p-value indicates the best fit of a distribution 
conditional to 𝐸(𝑢௧) = 0. In other words, this latter pair is considered to provide the least 
significant error terms. 
The numerical simulation for weekly data yields ቂ
𝛼
𝛽ቃ = ቂ
−0.03
0.21
ቃ. Here, the fitted distribution has a 
scaling s=1.16 and a degree of freedom of df=6. The probability that we incorrectly reject the 
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null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test is 0.8535. In Figure 3, we show the p-value (the 
goodness of fit) of the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test as a function of α and β. 
 
Figure 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnoff p-values in weekly analysis 
 
Notes: The figure represents the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests according to the colorbar to the right. The 
tests apply the null hypothesis that the measured and the fitted samples come from similar distributions. We use 
maximum likelihood distribution fitting for the standardized error terms of Eq. (32) given the Alpha and Beta values 
plotted in the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. The statistics are valid for weekly sampled returns. 
 
Our monthly analysis indicates the best fit at the ቂ
𝛼
𝛽ቃ = ቂ
−0.22
0.31
ቃ pair. The fitted distribution has a 
scaling s=1.15 and a degree of freedom of df=225. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff p-value in this 
case test is 0.9481. Figure 4 respresents the p-value (the goodness of fit) of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff test in the monthly results as a function of α and β. 
 
Figure 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnoff p-values in monthly analysis 
 
Notes: The figure represents the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests according to the colorbar to the right. The 
tests apply the null hypothesis that the measured and the fitted samples come from similar distributions. We use 
maximum likelihood distribution fitting for the standardized error terms of Eq. (32) given the Alpha and Beta values 
plotted in the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. The statistics are valid for monthly sampled returns. 
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Both results confirm our aforementioned reasoning for the negative effect of previous shocks on 
subsequent volatility; moreover, the positive relationship between risk and required return 
remains intact. The particularly high p-values indicate that the error terms are well fitted using 
scaled Student’s-t distributions. 
It is worth mentioning that the model presented above describes the dynamics of the volatility of 
the whole market. However, as presented in Appendix 1, asymmetric volatility affects individual 
assets as well. We argue that this phenomenon stands on the fact that market and asset returns 
are highly correlated, especially in periods of greater continuous shocks (e.g. the financial crisis) 
that affect volatility significantly. This latter correlation can be attributed to our aforementioned 
market microstructural reasoning: if heuristic-driven traders are present, demand for both the 
market portfolio and, thus, all of the risky assets increases (decreases) subsequent to negative 
(positive) market shocks. Moreover, the heuristic-driven demand affects positively the spread 
and the volatility 
We present a brief correlation test between the volatilities of the index and individual assets in 
Table 4. The results are consistent with the proposed reasoning for the asymmetry in case of 
individual assets. 
 
Table 4: Correlation between market and asset volatilities 
  Weekly analysis Monthly analysis 
Positive correlations 500 499 
significant at 5% 497 492 
Negative correlations 0 1 
significant at 5% 0 0 
Notes: The table represents cross-correlation statistics between individual asset volatilities and market volatility in the 
same period. The columns represent the results of the weekly and monthly sampled daily volatility. The rows stand 
for the number of positive correlations, those which are significantly positive at 0.05 level, the number of negative 
correlations and those which are significantly negative at 0.05 level. The 500 pairs represent the correlations between 
the 500 members of the S&P500 index and the index itself. 
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According to weekly analysis, volatility correlation with the index is positive for all the 500 
individual assets, although in three cases it is not significant. Nonetheless, these three latter 
assets (in particular, the equities with tickers “MNST”, “NAVI” and “NWSA”) have only become 
recently listed in the stock exchange, and therefore, correlation is tested on a much shorter 
interval than in the other cases. Hence, in these three cases the significance test yields low p-
values due to the insufficient number of observations. 
Applying monthly periods a similar pattern arises. Out of the 8 insignificant correlation 
coefficients 6 can be attributed to short available time series here as well. Altogether the 
positive correlation between individual assets is a robust pattern both in our weekly and monthly 
analysis, and hence, it is indeed a reasonable cause for the asymmetric volatility of individual 
assets. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
We find that asymmetric and autoregressive volatility measured in previous empirical studies in 
asset pricing can be derived from and attributed to intertemporal choice of investors, assuming 
that they behave according to prospect theory in a dynamic setting. We show that, in contrast to 
most of the studies on this topic, individuals tend to become less risk-averse (or risk-seeking 
until a given point) and more risk-averse subsequent to losses and gains respectively, which 
leads to the rejection of the volatility feedback and BHS explanations for asymmetric volatility. 
Furthermore, we argue that the third existing explanation (the leverage effect) does not hold 
either, as the analysis provided yields a significant, volatility decreasing effect of both previous 
gains and losses of a given asset when controlling for the market return. 
However, our proposed model is based on a negative relationship between market returns and 
market volatility, and is thus able to capture the dynamics of volatility measured empirically. 
Combining the linear relationship between risk and return, as presented above in detail, and the 
aforementioned pattern in the intertemporal choice (i.e. the required return) yields the 
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autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model presented in this paper. We show that the 
discrete and continuous time alternatives of the main equation result in the TGARCH and 
EGARCH models respectively, which, in particular, are measured to be two of the regressions 
with the highest goodness-of-fit in most of the empirical studies. Moreover, an empirical 
parameter estimation in discrete time indicates that the proposed model indeed outperforms the 
simple random walk model, and the negative effect of previous outcomes is significant. 
Potential ways of further research include various opportunities. First, an experimental analysis 
would be interesting to show whether these patterns are found in a laboratory environment as 
well if the focus is on the effect of breaking-even. Second, the influence of this behavior on 
asset liquidity and market microstructure could be analyzed in detail including an empirical 
analysis of the probability estimation of heuristic-driven traders. Third, the application of the 
proposed model in mathematical finance could reveal further interesting patterns; in particular, 
asymmetric stochastic volatility models (Heston and Nandi, 2000) in option pricing are found to 
provide better estimates on option prices and fit the “volatility smile” of the Black-Scholes 
implied volatilities, which regressions could be further improved by including the proposed 
model described in this paper. Finally, the introduction of cognitive research, such as the 
neuroeconomic approach, could reveal further underlying factors behind the behavioral patterns 
presented in this paper. 
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Appendix 1 
 
In the followings, we provide empirical evidence that further develops the existing explanations 
of asymmetric volatility effect. In theory, the volatility feedback would imply increased volatility 
following price shocks regardless of their sign while leverage effect would imply negative 
correlation with the asset return. The data used to test the hypotheses consist of the daily log-
returns of members of the Standard and Poor’s 500 index on 10 September, 2014. The 
analyzed period covers 21 years from 10 September 1993 to 10 September 2014. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology of the regression analysis is defined as follows. First, the data is pooled 
together, therefore, the 501 (500 members and the index itself) time-series constitute the panel. 
Then, two different panels are created by calculating the non-overlapping weekly and monthly 
returns by aggregating the daily log-returns. In the same time, a volatility panel is generated as 
well by measuring the standard deviation of daily returns in each weekly and monthly period for 
each asset. As the aim is to measure the effect of previous shocks on the change of volatility 
the first regression is estimated as 
 
Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽መ𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝑒௧,௜,     (A1) 
 
where Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ − 𝑣𝑜𝑙௧ିଵ,௜, 𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ and 𝑒௧,௜ stand for the difference of volatility (i.e. standard 
deviation of daily returns in period t), the previous period return and the error term of the i-th 
asset respectively. One might argue that positive and negative shocks have a different effect on 
the change of volatility, thus causing biased results. Therefore we expand Eq. (A1) with a 
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variable 𝑟ା௧ିଵ that takes the value of the return if it is non-negative and zero otherwise. The 
estimation yields the form 
 
Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝑟ା௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝑒௧,௜.    (A2) 
 
In order to test the discontinuity around zero return (in the ±0.05 quantile environment of the 
empirical distribution), a dummy for positive values, 𝛼ොା is tested as well; hence 
 
Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝛼ො + 𝛼ොା + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝑟ା௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝑒௧,௜.    (A3) 
 
The existence of volatility feedback effect could be analyzed at this point by testing whether the 
coefficients of both previous gains and losses are significantly higher than zero. However, the 
interpretation of the leverage effect still might be misleading due to omitted factors. The latter 
explanation states that volatility is negatively correlated with previous asset returns; 
nonetheless, Eq. (A3) may include the contribution of other factors such as the market return as 
well. Hence, the following estimation reveals the clean, decomposed effect of the previous 
market and asset returns on volatility: 
 
Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝛼ො + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝑟ା௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଷ෢𝑟ெ,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସ෢𝑟ାெ,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௧,௜,  (A4) 
 
where 𝑟ெ,௧ିଵ and 𝑟ାெ,௧ିଵ stand for the market return and the non-negative market return 
respectively. One may argue that due to data pooling, the average change of volatility (𝛼ො) of 
separate assets differs; thus, causing biased estimation. The representation of Eq. (A4) hence 
becomes 
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Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ = 𝛼ො௜ + 𝛽ଵ෢𝑟௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଶ෢𝑟ା௧ିଵ,௜ + 𝛽ଷ෢𝑟ெ,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସ෢𝑟ାெ,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௧,௜.   (A5) 
 
Using the fixed effect approach that filters out individual trends, which demeans the variables 
with respect to time in this particular setting, yields 
 
Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜ − EൣΔ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜൧ = 𝛽ଵ෢(𝑟௧ିଵ − E[𝑟௧ିଵ]) + 𝛽ଶ෢(𝑟ା௧ିଵ − E[𝑟ା௧ିଵ]) + 
+𝛽ଷ෢൫𝑟ெ,௧ିଵ − Eൣ𝑟ெ,௧ିଵ൧൯ + 𝛽ସ෢൫𝑟ାெ,௧ିଵ − Eൣ𝑟ାெ,௧ିଵ൧൯ + 𝑒௧,௜.    (A6) 
 
Empirical results 
Table A1 summarizes the OLS estimation results of models from Eq. (A1) to (A6) (as indicated 
by numbers in the first row) using weekly statistics. 
 
Table A1: Weekly regression results 
 
1 2 3 4 6 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
α 0.0000 0.0991 0.0020 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 - - 
α+ - - - - -0.0002 0.3489 - - - - 
β1 -0.0214 0.0000 0.0306 0.0000 0.1262 0.0337 0.0544 0.0000 0.0518 0.0000 
β2 - - -0.1070 0.0000 -0.2301 0.0045 -0.1326 0.0000 -0.1339 0.0000 
β3 - - - - - - -0.1252 0.0000 -0.0916 0.0000 
β4 - - - - - - 0.1621 0.0000 0.0281 0.0000 
 
Including market return as well reveals an interesting pattern: changes of volatility are negatively 
correlated with previous market returns, whereas we find no correlation between previous asset 
return and volatility (thus, volatility decreases subsequent to both gains and losses). Contrary to 
the volatility feedback hypothesis and McQueen and Vorkink’s explanation, according to the 
negative aggregate effect (β1+β2) present in Eq. (A1) to (A6) for previous gains, volatility indeed 
decreases. Furthermore, the positive coefficients in Eq. (A2) to (A6) of β1 reject the existence of 
the leverage effect that would require a negative relationship between losses and the change of 
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volatility. This latter finding is in line with the findings of Hasanhodzic and Lo (2011): they 
underline that leverage effect is existent in the case of all-equity-financed companies as well, 
and therefore, reject the hypothesis. 
In order to better represent the decomposed effect, Figure A1 shows Eq. (A6) on the [-
0.05,0.05] return interval where the solid and dotted lines represent the effect of previous asset 
and market return respectively. The dashed line stands for Δ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,ప෣ − EൣΔ𝑣𝑜𝑙௧,௜൧ = 0. 
 
Figure A1: Effect of previous asset and market shocks 
 
We argue that the effects are driven by two distinct factors. On the one hand, the previous 
market return has indeed a negative correlation with the volatility of an asset. As we show 
below, this is due to the aggregate perception of utility caused by the loss-averse behavior in a 
dynamic setting. In other words, investors turn to riskier assets providing higher expected return 
in order to be able to break even and compensate for previous losses. On the other hand, the 
volatility-decreasing effect of previous shocks of a given asset is simply caused by the base 
effect: in case of massive shocks in the asset price the contemporaneous volatility rises and, 
since volatility follows a strong mean-reverting process, the unusually high or low level of 
volatility is followed by a decrease or increase respectively. This latter proposition is supported 
  41 
by the results that the lag-1 autocorrelation of the volatility difference of each asset is negative 
and is significant at 5% in our sample: a rise in volatility is likely to be followed by a decrease. 
In order to increase the robustness of these results a monthly test is also provided in Table A2, 
where we focus on regressions Eq. (A1) and (A6) omitting the transitory steps. The results are 
in line with the weekly analysis, and therefore, the pattern is robust regardless of the length of 
the period applied. 
 
Table A2: Monthly regression results 
 
1 6 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value 
Α 0.0000 0.2898 - - 
β1 -0.0080 0.0000 0.0169 0.0000 
β2 - - -0.0423 0.0000 
β3 - - -0.0317 0.0000 
β4 - - 0.0210 0.0000 
 
One may argue that these results are subject to selection bias (i.e. some members existent at 
the end of the examination period have no trading data at the beginning): fluctuations towards 
the end of the period are over weighted. Therefore, another robustness test is presented in the 
first column of Table A3 including the 340 equities traded in both 1993 and 2014. Another 
argument against the latter regressions could be related to the 21 year period in use, therefore, 
in column 2 and 3 subperiods of 2007-2008 covering the main events of the recent financial 
crisis and that of 2009-2014 are estimated. These tests are provided only for weekly data in 
order to keep the number of observations sufficiently high and only Eq. (A6) is estimated to 
compare the results. 
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Table A3: Robustness test results 
  340 members 2007-2008 2009-2014 
  Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
α - - - - - - 
β1 0.0352 0 -0.0163 0 0.0019 0.105 
β2 -0.1019 0 0.01 0.008 -0.0011 0.351 
β3 -0.0776 0 -0.1058 0 -0.0494 0 
β4 0.016 0 -0.0552 0.007 0.0021 0.558 
 
These results confirm that market return is negatively correlated with the subsequent change in 
volatility, whereas the effect of the asset return either remain the same or becomes minor in 
magnitude relative to that of the market return. 
